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I. INTRODUCTION  
The TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent 
members from taking measures to protect public heath.
1
  
 --- World Trade Organization, Doha Summit         
                   2001.                                        
With the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (―TRIPS‖)2, advocates 
for patent protection rejoiced, while those concerned about 
world health and access to medicines lamented. One of the most 
visible results following the enactment of TRIPS in 1995 was 
higher drug prices for health programs in developing and least 
developed countries (―LDCs‖).3 At the same time, the poorest 
regions of the world, mostly encompassing sub-Saharan Africa, 
had the highest concentrations of people with treatable diseases 
such as AIDS/HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria.
4
 
TRIPS sought to balance patent protection and access to 
medicines, but the results indicate that TRIPS has only decrease 
access to affordable medicines.  Numerous factors contribute to 
the lack of access, but one of the largest barriers is the 
medicines‘ exorbitant cost. High costs are a direct result of 
TRIPS patent protection, which prevents the production of 
generic drugs that can be sold at a lower cost.
5
  For example, the 
                                                 
1 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001, ¶ 4, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 
I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
2
 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS]. 
3 Jennifer May Rogers, Note, The TRIPS Council‟s Solution to the 
Paragraph 6 Problem: Toward Compulsory Licensing Viability for Developing 
Countries, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 443, 443 (2004).   
4 Erin M. Anderson, Note, Unnecessary Deaths and Unnecessary Costs:  
Getting patented Drugs to Patients Most in Need, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 85, 85 
(2009). 
5 Jessica L. Greenbaum, Comment, TRIPS and Public Health:  Solutions for 
Ensuring Global Access to Essential AIDS Medication in the Wake of the Paragraph 
6 Waiver, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 142, 142–43 (2008); Alan O. Sykes, 
TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the DOHA “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. 
INT‘L L. 47, 47 (2002); See Joint U.N. Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2008 Report on the 
Global AIDS Epidemic 157 (Aug. 2008), available at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Glob
al_report.asp.  
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United Nations Commission on Human Rights reported that the 
HIV drug Fluconazole costs $55 in India, where the drug does 
not enjoy patent protection. This same drug costs $697 in 
Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia, and $817 in the Philippines, all 
places where the drug is patented.
6
  Unfortunately, ―an 
abundance of poor health contributes to status as a poor country, 
just as a poor country translates into high concentrations of poor 
health.‖7  Additionally, restrictions on compulsory licensing 
under Article 31(f) kept developing countries and LDCs from 
actually manufacturing necessary medicines for exportation or 
importation, further inhibiting access to life saving 
pharmaceuticals.
8
 Thus, the practical effects of TRIPS (e.g., 
increased drug costs with restrictions on obtaining affordable 
generic versions)
9
 prompted the World Trade Organization 
(―WTO‖) to issue a declaration at the 2001 Doha Ministerial, 
stressing the importance of taking the necessary ―measures to 
protect public health.‖10  One measure subsequently taken was 
the amendment Article 31-bis.
11
 This amendment modifies some 
of the restrictions originally placed on the compulsory licensing 
scheme. While WTO members officially accepted the 
amendment on December 6, 2005, the amendment will not 
become part of TRIPS until two thirds of the WTO countries 
ratify it.
12
 The WTO first imposed a December 2007 deadline 
for ratification,
13
 but then extended it to December 2009,
14
 and 
                                                 
6 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm‘n on the Promotion 
and Prot. of Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4
/590516104e92e87bc1256aa8004a8191/$FILE/G0114345.pdf. 
7 Anderson, supra  note 4, at 86 n.8. 
8 CARLOS M. CORREA, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL 
DECISION ON PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (2004) (Health Economics and Drugs, EDM Series No.16).    
9 Ellen ‗t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential 
Medicines:  A Long Way From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 27, 27 (2002).   
10 Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 4.   
11
 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 
2005) [hereinafter Article 31-bis]. 
12 Press Release, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment to Make 
Health Flexibility Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Amendment Press Release], 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e. 
13 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 6 December 2005, 
WT/L/641 (2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm. 
14 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 18 December 2007, 
WT/L/711 (2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-
711_e.pdf. 
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subsequently to December 2011.
15
  As of February 2010, only 
fifty-four member countries have ratified the amendment.
16
   
This Note examines why the amendment, which was created 
to provide flexibility and better access to medicines, has not yet 
achieved the necessary signatures for ratification. Part II 
provides an overview of compulsory licensing schemes and 
explores how Article 31-bis infuse greater flexibility into the 
current TRIPS scheme. Part III explores the obstacles many 
countries face in their efforts to ratify Article 31-bis, including 
procedural hurdles and ambiguity in defining adequate 
remuneration under the amendment. Part IV discusses Rwanda‘s 
experience in invoking Article 31-bis and the paragraph six 
waiver. Finally, Part V suggests that pharmaceutical companies 
may be willing to negotiate lower prices as an alternative to 
compulsory licensing. 
II. WHILE TRIPS ARTICLE 31(F) PREVENTS COUNTRIES 
FROM GRANTING COMPULSORY LICENSES IN CERTAIN 
SITUATIONS, ARTICLE 31-BIS ELIMINATES SOME OF THESE 
RESTRICTIONS  
A.  A Compulsory License is a Government Grant to Use a 
Patent Without the Permission of the Patent Holder 
One goal of TRIPS was to alleviate the barriers imposed on 
WTO member countries by patent protections, in cases where a 
legitimate public need arises.
17
 The WTO accomplished this 
goal by including language in Article 31 permitting countries to 
issue compulsory licenses.
18
  A compulsory license is issued by 
the government, and allows a competitor of the patent owner to 
manufacture, produce, process, or sell the patented invention 
without the patent owner‘s permission, in order to address a 
public need.
19
  Compulsory licenses historically were issued for 
purposes such as: 
 
                                                 
15 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 17 December 2009, 
WT/L/785 (2009), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-
785_e.pdf. 
16 WTO Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 
[hereinafter Status of Ratification], 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2010).  
17 Amendment Press Release, supra note 12. 
18 TRIPS, supra note 2, at 1210. 
19 Mike Gumbel, Comment, Is Article 31 Bis Enough? The Need to Promote 
Economies of Scale in the International Compulsory Licensing System, 22 TEMP. 
INT‘L & COMP. L.J. 161, 162 (2008).   
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to deal with a situation in which a patent owner is 
unwilling to work his invention[;] to satisfy an unmet 
demand from the public for a patented product[;] to 
introduce a price-reducing competition for important but 
expensive products, e.g. drugs[;] to deal with a situation 
in which refusal to license a patent, or the imposition of 
unreasonable terms, is preventing the exploitation of 
another invention which is of technical or economic 
importance; to prevent abuses of patent rights . . . [; and] 
to prevent the creation of potential competition-
inhibiting monopolies.
20
   
  
By the 1990‘s, roughly one hundred countries had incorporated 
some type of compulsory licensing scheme, though relatively 
few compulsory licenses have ever actually been issued.
21
 
Under TRIPS, the purposes and requirements for issuing a 
compulsory license are narrow.  A government seeking to issue 
a compulsory license typically must first attempt to negotiate 
with the patent holder for a potential license.
22
  However, a 
government may waive this requirement ―in the case of a 
national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency or 
[when the compulsory license is limited to] public non-
commercial use.‖23 ―The public interest of achieving broader 
access to the patented [medicine] is considered more important 
than the private interest of the [patent] holder in fully exploiting 
his exclusive rights.‖24  Nevertheless, compulsory licensing still 
requires appropriate remuneration to the patent holder for 
violating his exclusive rights under the patent.
25
 
Despite the provisions permitting compulsory licensing, few 
developing countries have actually invoked their rights under 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
26
 It was not until 2007 that 
emerging markets found the political will to invoke compulsory 
licensing. For example, in January 2007 Thailand issued a 
license for generic manufacturing of a HIV/AIDS drug patented 
                                                 
20 Graham Dutfield, Delivering Drugs to the Poor:Will the TRIPS 
Amendment Help?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 107, 110–11 (2008) (emphasis added).   
21 Id. at 111-12 (noting that Canada, who issued 613 compulsory licenses 
for the manufacture or importation of medicines between 1969 and 1992, represents 
an anomaly to the infrequent issuing of compulsory licenses).   
22 TRIPS, supra note 2, at 1209. 
23 Id. 
24 Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health:  A Solution to the 
Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 73, 77 (2004). 
25 TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 31(h).   
26 Gail E. Evans, Strategic Patent Licensing for Public Research 
Organizations: Deploying Restriction and Reservation Clauses to Promote Medical 
R&D in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 175, 183 (2008). 
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by U.S.-based Abbott Laboratories.
27
 Brazil followed Thailand‘s 
lead and issued a compulsory license for a Merck-patented 
HIV/AIDS drug in May 2007.
28
 
Compulsory licensing inherently seems to advocate a moral 
and altruistic duty to protect society from unreasonable patent 
exclusivity.
29
 However, patent holders and countries advocating 
for strong intellectual property rights openly repudiate countries 
that invoke compulsory licensing.
30
 The United States has 
―openly expressed its displeasure when developing country 
governments have brought in measures to prioritize public 
health in ways that limit the full enjoyment of the intellectual 
property rights of U.S. businesses.‖31  
Despite this public condemnation,
32
 the United States itself 
has issued compulsory licenses under its own domestic laws.  
When there was an Anthrax scare in 2001, the U.S. government 
sought to stockpile vast quantities of Bayer‘s ciprofloxacin 
(―Cipro‖), an anthrax antibiotic.33  It was mostly concerned with 
acquiring large amounts of the drug, but also wanted it at a 
reduced price. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy 
Thompson threatened Bayer, saying that if it did not lower the 
price of Cipro by fifty-percent, then the government would 
acquire the drug from other sources.
34
 This mere threat induced 
Bayer to strike a deal with the U.S. government. Bayer agreed to 
supply it with Cipro at a significantly reduced cost.
35
 The United 
States‘ use of compulsory licensing, while hypocritical, is a 
perfect example of what should be done in a public emergency. 
It also demonstrates how the provisions in TRIPS can protect all 
countries in much the same way through a compulsory licensing 
scheme. 
 
                                                 
27 Elizabeth H. Williams, Just Say „No‟ to Big Pharma, 170 FAR E. ECON. 
REV. 43, 43 (2007). 
28 Evans, supra note 26, at 184. 
29 See generally International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 4 (asking State Parties to recognize an 
individual‘s right to enjoy ―the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health‖).  
30 Sykes, supra note 5, at 50. 
31 Dutfield, supra note 20, at 115.   
32 See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical 
Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining 
WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT‘L ECON. 
L. 1069, 1088 (1996). 
33 See Keith Bradsher, Bayer Agrees to Charge Government a Lower Price 
for Anthrax Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at B8. 
34 Id. The US government seriously considered using the Indian version of 
Cipro, even though Bayer owned the US patent. See Ellen‘t Hoen & Pierre Chirac, 
Op-Ed., Don‟t Renege on Doha, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, June 25, 2002. 
35 Bradsher, supra note 33. 
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B. Article 31-bis Infuses More Flexibility into TRIPS‟ 
Compulsory Licensing Scheme 
While the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme articulates a 
way for developing nations to access patented drugs,
36
 TRIPS 
also requires that the compulsory license primary benefit the 
domestic market only.
37
  In other words, a country may issue a 
compulsory license only to a domestic manufacturer who does 
not export drugs.  However, the countries in most need of the 
drugs do not have adequate manufacturing capacities to produce 
them.
38
 Thus, while the TRIPS compulsory licensing scheme 
gives developing countries the ability to avoid high costs 
associated with recognizing pharmaceutical patents, licensing 
requirements still erect hurdles for these countries that lack 
sufficient manufacturing capability.
39
 The domestic restriction 
unduly burdens importing countries wishing to obtain the drugs. 
It also hinders exporting countries with the manufacturing 
capability because it keeps them from selling generic 
medications to LDCs or other developing countries.
40
     
India provided the biggest impetus for review of Article 
31(f)‘s domestic supply requirement and ultimately for the 
proposed paragraph 6 waiver / Article 31-bis.  During the 
transitional period after TRIPS‘ initial implementation, India 
developed a world-class generic drug production capacity.
41
  
India did not grant patent protection to pharmaceuticals before 
TRIPS. Therefore, after the enactment of TRIPS, it would not be 
required to grant such protection until 2005, when the transition 
period ended.  During the ten-year transition period, India was 
able to manufacture drugs ―that were otherwise on-patent in 
developed (and many developing) countries.‖42 India‘s generic 
industry was so successful that all major drug procurement 
agencies like UNICEF, IDA, Doctors without Borders, as well 
as countries like Lesotho and Zimbabwe, purchased generic 
drugs from the Indian pharmaceutical industry.
43
 However, 
                                                 
36 Rogers, supra note 3, at 447.   
37 TRIPS, supra note 2, at art. 31(f). 
38 Anderson, supra note 4, at 96. 
39 Gumbel, supra note 19, at 162. 
40 See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: 
Analysis of WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 617 
(2004).  
41 Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round‟s Public 
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines 
Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 921, 934 (2007). 
42 Id.   
43 ANAND & ANAND ADVOCATES, REPORT ON IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
PROPOSED ARTICLE 31BIS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT  xxxiii, 
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under TRIPS, any drugs developed in India after 2005 would 
have to be patented. The domestic distribution requirement of 
Article 31(f) also prevents India from exporting drugs to other 
countries or world health organizations in need. 
The WTO General Council recognized that the domestic 
distribution requirement made a compulsory licensing scheme 
useless for many countries. The General Council announced an 
interim waiver allowing countries to export generic medicines to 
countries that were issued a compulsory license, and are in 
need.
44
 The WTO members ultimately negotiated and codified 
this ―paragraph 6‖ waiver into the amendment Article 31-bis.45 
While the amendment does not go into effect until two-thirds of 
the WTO members ratify it, the amendment was accepted by the 
body and opened for signature on December 6, 2005.
46
 
The main purpose of Article 31-bis is to waive the domestic 
supply requirement under Article 31(f).
47
 Article 31-bis 
accomplish this in two ways.  First, it allows a country to grant a 
compulsory license to import a particular drug. This allows 
countries lacking sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity 
within their own country to still obtain cheaper generic drugs.
48
  
Second, the amendment allows a country, such as India, to 
export a generic drug to a country that has issued a compulsory 
license.
49
   Other substantive provisions include: 
 
1) no restrictions on the types of drugs for which a  
      compulsory license may be granted;
50
  
2) importing countries (LDCs excluded) must notify  
      TRIPS of their eligibility and desire to use the 
      compulsory licensing under the Article 31-bis  
scheme;
51
  
3) in determining eligibility for a country to import a  
                                                                                                         
http://www.nhicindia.org/content/ wrindia/Nupur/doc7011131200957.pdf (last visited 
May 8, 2010). 
44 James T. Tsai, Note, Not Tripping over the Pebbles:  Focusing on 
Overlooked TRIPS Article 66 for Technology Transfer to Solve Africa‟s AIDS Crisis, 
11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 447, 458 (2007). 
45 Article 31-bis, supra note 11.   
46 See Amendment Press Release, supra note 12; Status of Ratification, 
supra note 16. 
47 Article 31-bis, supra note 11. 
48 Baker, supra note 40, at 640–42. 
49 See Article 31-bis, supra note 11, at Annex to the Protocol Amending the 
TRIPS Agreement ¶ 1.   
50 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 41, at 936-37 (pointing out that many 
developed nations, including the United States and the EU, wanted to limit the 
compulsory licenses to drugs for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria or for ―grave‖ 
public health problems.  However, developing countries were able to negotiate so that 
the Amendment imposes NO restrictions). 
51 Article 31-bis, supra note 11, at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 1(b).     
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specific drug, the importing country must either be  
an LDC or make a determination in accordance with  
the Appendix to Article 31-bis that the country lacks 
  the manufacturing capacity for that specific drug;
52
     
4) importing countries must issue a compulsory license,  
but only if there is domestic patent protection OR the  
country is NOT an LDC;
53
   
5) importing countries must also notify the TRIPS  
Council, specifying the name of the products and the  
expected quantities to be imported;
54
   
6) exporting countries must also issue a compulsory  
license;
55
  
7) exporting countries may export only the requested  
amount, must distinguish the drugs by special  
packaging or labeling, and must record each export  
shipment on a WTO website;
56
  
8) exporting countries must pay remuneration to the  
patent holder, taking into account the economic  
circumstances of the importing country;
57
 
9) importing countries must ―take reasonable  
measures‖ to prevent re-exportation of the drug so  
that the medicines are in fact used for public health  
purposes;
58
 and 
10) no Member state shall challenge any measures taking  
in conformity with Article 31-bis.
59
 
III. ARTICLE 31-BIS FACIALLY CAN IMPROVE ACCESS TO 
VITAL MEDICINES, BUT TOO MANY OBSTACLES PREVENT ITS 
EFFECTIVENESS 
The procedural requirements of Article 31-bis as outlined 
above are numerous, and many criticize the amendment for 
imposing too many unnecessary obstacles.
60
 Controversy 
surrounds the adoption of Article 31-bis. Particular criticism 
comes from NGOs and other similar agencies dealing with 
                                                 
52 Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(a)(ii), App. to the Annex of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
53 Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(a)(iii). 
54 Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(a)(i). 
55 Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 2(b). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at Annex to the Protocol ¶ 2. 
58 Id. at Annex to the TRIPS Agreement ¶ 3.   
59 Id. at Annex to the Protocol ¶ 4. 
60 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 41, at 932.  See also MEDECINS SANS 
FRONTIERES, DOHA DERAILED: A PROGRESS REPORT ON TRIPS AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES, Aug. 27, 2003, http://www.msf.org.au/uploads/media/cancun.pdf. 
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global health.
61
 Specifically, Doctors without Borders 
characterized Article 31-bis as ill-researched and not a viable 
plan to increase access to medicine.
62
  Doctors without Borders 
voiced its skepticism to the amendment by stating: ―the decision 
shows that the WTO is ignoring day-to-day reality of drug 
production and procurement. The amendment has made 
permanent a burdensome drug-by-drug, country-by-country 
decision-making process…‖63   
A. The Many Requirements Under Article 31-bis Make  
Ratification Unappealing to Many Developing Countries 
With only a small number of WTO member states ratifying 
the amendment, many critics argue that the cross-boundary 
compulsory licensing procedures outlined in Article 31-bis 
remain too complex, especially for developing countries to 
understand.
64
 Some also argue that generic pharmaceutical 
companies may want to avoid the rigmarole of negotiating with 
both domestic patent owners and foreign governments before 
they can provide the necessary medicines.
65
  Furthermore, the 
process of both the exporting and importing countries obtaining 
compulsory licenses increases transaction costs and possibilities 
for delay.
66
    
The public notification provision in Article 31-bis that 
requires a showing of a country‘s intent to use a compulsory 
licensing scheme is unreasonable and unnecessary. Some 
commentators surmise that no developing country had made the 
general notification of intent, due to fears of hostile criticism or 
even retaliatory action from developed countries, including the 
United States and the E.U.
67
 Developing countries fear implying 
that they may one day choose to invoke compulsory licensing. 
                                                 
61 E.g., Roger Bate & Richard Tren, Health Policy Outlook on the WTO and 
Access to Essential Medicines:  Recent Agreements, New Assignments, AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL‘Y RES., Feb. 13, 2006, 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060216_19636HPO200604_g.pdf. 
62 Tsai, supra note 44, at 458 (in which Medecins San Frontieres cited the 
procedural requirements for both importing and exporting countries as overly 
burdensome and bureaucratic and held that these requirements are a main reason why 
Article 31-bis will not increase access to medicines). See also Members Strike Deal 
on Trips and Public Health; Civil Society Unimpressed, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE 
NEWS DIG. (Geneva, Switz.), Dec. 7, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Society Unimpressed with 
Article 31-bis]. 
63 Society Unimpressed with Article 31-bis, supra note 62, at 3. 
64 Dutfield, supra note 20, at 123. 
65 Id. 
66 Mark C. Lang, Note, What a Long, Strange “TRIPS” It‟s Been: 
Compulsory Licensing from the Adoption of TRIPS to the Agreement on 
Implementation of the Doha Declaration, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 331, 
343 (2004). 
67 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 41, at 938. 
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The provision requiring general notification to the TRIPS 
Council serves no purpose other than to publically broadcast 
desires to use compulsory licensing along with erecting political 
barriers limiting the usefulness of Article 31-bis.
68
   While this 
is just one example of an unnecessary procedural requirement, 
TRIPS and Article 31-bis are replete with administrative 
headaches. Simplifying the scheme could induce more countries 
to ratify the amendment.  
B. Pressure from Developed Countries and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Weigh Heavily in a Developing Country‟s Decision to 
Ratify Article 31-bis 
Developed countries, known for protecting intellectual 
property rights, pressure developing countries to refrain from 
using compulsory licenses. They do this even as they invoke 
compulsory licenses on their own behalf (e.g., the United States 
and Cipro in 2001).
69
  In 2001, the U.S. sought sanctions against 
Brazil for invoking a compulsory license on a U.S. patented 
drug.  This sent a strong message to the rest of the world that the 
U.S. was willing to take extreme measures to protect its 
pharmaceutical companies.
70
 The United States‘ widely 
criticized actions created legitimate fears that countries could be 
subject to reprisal in the form of sanctions, litigation, and trade 
restrictions if they invoke compulsory licenses.  While the U.S. 
eventually withdrew its complaint against Brazil from the WTO 
panel, the lingering effects chilled efforts by the international 
community to invoke compulsory licensing.
71
 
Article 31-bis attempted to rectify this situation by including 
a provision where WTO members shall not challenge ―any 
measures taken in conformity‖ with the provisions of Article 31-
bis or TRIPS.
72
 However, a lingering fear of sanctions following 
the 2001 Brazil litigation along with trepidation over angering 
pharmaceutical companies arguably deters developing countries 
from ratifying the amendment.
73
    
 Pharmaceutical lobbying efforts have also been an obstacle 
to the ratification of Article 31-bis. From the industry‘s 
perspective, it simply is unfair and counterproductive to allow a 
government to issue a compulsory license.  The industry claims 
that the high cost of research and development (an average of 
$500 million per new drug) demands adequate compensation to 
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both recoup costs and promote the development of new 
medicines.
74
 Interestingly, however, the pharmaceutical industry 
was either first or second in Fortune Magazine‘s rankings of the 
most profitable sectors of the U.S. economy
 
for the period 1960 
to 1991.
75
  Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical industry has been 
putting ―pressure on developing nations to prevent the local 
manufacture or importation of cheaper versions of the drugs 
produced in countries where either they cannot be patented or 
where the patents are not respected.‖76 This pressure could also 
discourage developing countries from ratifying Article 31-bis or 
even invoking compulsory licenses under the current TRIPS 
scheme. 
C. Ambiguity Surrounding “Adequate Remuneration” May 
Discourage Countries from Ratifying Article 31-bis 
While Article 31(h) requires adequate remuneration to the 
patent holder, concerns over double remuneration were 
alleviated with Article 31-bis, which, requires that the exporting 
country shall bear the costs of remuneration.
77
  However, the 
amendment equates the appropriate level of remuneration to the 
―economic value to the importing member of the use of the 
patent right that has been authorized.‖78   
 Developed countries believe that adequate remuneration 
should equate to full compensation for the product.
79
  They posit 
that intellectual property rights must be respected and valued, 
and the high cost of developing drugs warrants such high 
compensation. Furthermore, if there is no adequate 
compensation from their perspective, incentives to research 
diseases, especially those primarily affecting developing 
countries, are hindered.
80
 While the developed countries‘ 
argument is persuasive, it runs counter to the Doha 
Declaration‘s humanitarian goal of protecting public health.81 
Additionally, allowing full compensation to patent holders 
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would create a windfall, because they would be able to collect 
profits in a previously unavailable market.
82
 
LDCs and developing countries are at the opposite end of 
the spectrum in terms of compensation—they believe there 
should be no remuneration, or at most, minimal remuneration, 
for use of the patent. While this seems laudable from a 
humanitarian perspective, a complete lack of remuneration does 
not effectively balance the patent owner‘s right with the 
developing country‘s need to protect public health.   
Article 31-bis attempts to strike the middle ground between 
full compensation and no remuneration.  However, the lack of 
guidelines defining adequate remuneration
83
 may lead exporting 
countries to pay prices that are: (1) too high, thereby negating 
the potential gains they receive as a result of producing low cost 
medicine; or (2) too low, in which case the patent holder would 
not receive adequate compensation for use of his patent.
84
  Thus, 
countries may be wary of ratifying Article 31-bis because there 
is no clear standard for determining adequate remuneration. 
 
D. Exporting Countries Must Enact Domestic Legislation in 
Order to Comply with TRIPS and Article 31-Bis – Such 
Legislation is Politically Difficult to Achieve and Financially 
Expensive 
 
Each individual exporting member state must enact 
legislation to ensure that its domestic laws comply with the 
regulations under TRIPS and Article 31-bis.
85
  This creates a 
significant financial and political burden on WTO member 
states who export generic drugs. The legislation must not only 
meet the requirements imposed by the WTO and provide 
humanitarian relief to importing countries, but it must also 
benefit the exporting country.
86
  Currently, no guidelines or 
model rules exist for a legislative and institutional framework 
that could be adopted by countries possessing the manufacturing 
capacity, and the desire to export the generic medicines into 
developing countries.
87
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 Drafting the required legislation from scratch without 
guidelines or model rules is an arduous process.  Countries must 
expend significant resources, both from a financial and a legal 
expertise perspective, to create sound public policy and 
legislation.
88
  TRIPS addresses the difficulty of this process, and 
depending on a country‘s economic development, articulates 
different temporal deadlines by which legislation must be 
passed.
89
   Still, many countries have not yet crafted the required 
legislation to pass compliance under TRIPS, let alone 
compliance with the recent Article 31-bis Amendment.
90
 
In May 2004, Canada became one of the first countries to 
implement legislation designed to carry out the amendment‘s 
mission.
91
 Under the legislative scheme, Canada‘s 
Commissioner of Patents could ―grant compulsory licenses 
permitting the manufacture and export of low-cost versions of 
patented pharmaceuticals.‖92 According to a statement by the 
Canadian government, ―[r]epresentatives of Canada's generic 
and brand name drug companies, and various non-governmental 
organizations were consulted during the development of the 
legislation and regulations. The Regime balances Canada's trade 
and intellectual property obligations with the humanitarian 
objective of the [Doha Declaration].‖93 It took over nine months 
for Canada to draft its legislation. If developing countries do not 
act immediately to implement similar legislation, the results 
could be tragic. Nine months is too long for a developing 
country to wait once it has declared a public health emergency. 
Canada‘s legislation seeks ―to facilitate timely access to 
generic versions of patented drugs, especially those needed by 
least-developed or developing countries to fight HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases.‖94  Canada‘s Regime 
ensures that the drugs exported subscribe to the same standards 
as drugs for the Canadian market. Standards for safety, 
effectiveness, quality and issuance are the same for all drugs 
produced in Canada.
95
  Health Canada also reviews products for 
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export under the compulsory licensing scheme, just as it does 
for domestically produced pharmaceuticals.  Review is subject 
to a special fast-track process to avoid delaying drug delivery to 
countries in need.
96
 The legislation also limits the drugs eligible 
for manufacture. Only drugs listed on the World Health 
Organization‘s Model List of Essential Medicines can be made, 
although Canada does reserve the right to add drugs to that 
list.
97
  The Canadian Regime utilizes less restrictive guidelines 
regarding which countries can import drugs.
98
   
Canada‘s Regime seems straightforward and the legislation 
appears to strike the proper balance between safety and 
expediency. Nevertheless, the legislation also ―requires the good 
will of pharmaceutical companies to participate in the Regime to 
fulfill the humanitarian objective of alleviating public health 
problems in developing nations.‖99 Before obtaining a 
compulsory license from the Canadian government, the generic 
manufacturer must first seek a voluntary license from the patent 
holder.  This voluntary license, which depends on the goodwill 
of the patent holder, makes Canada‘s legislative scheme more 
rigorous than the standards for compulsory licensing under 
TRIPS.
100
 Relying on a patent holder‘s goodwill has already 
proven difficult, as evidence by the situation in Rwanda in 
2007.
101
 
While it is typically burdensome to draft and enact 
legislation, there does not appear to be a feasible alternative at 
the moment. States do not have a perfect legislative model to 
adopt automatically.
102
 Coupling this difficulty with other 
procedural requirements under Article 31-bis creates a situation 
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where countries are unwilling to ratify the amendment simply 
because of the inefficient bureaucratic hurdles.   
IV. FEW COUNTRIES HAVE INVOKED ARTICLE 31-BIS OR 
THE WAIVER TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO PATENTED 
MEDICINES 
Despite difficulty ratifying Article 31-bis, the Paragraph 6 
waiver has been in force since 2003. However, no country chose 
to exercise its compulsory licensing rights until 2007.
103
 This 
failure to rely on compulsory licensing, even though it is legally 
permissible suggests that ratification of Article 31-bis would not 
have a significant effect on developing countries.  While the 
language of TRIPS and Article 31-bis is problematic, 
implementation of a compulsory licensing scheme also presents 
issues, as shown by Rwanda‘s experience with Canada.   
On July 19, 2007, Rwanda notified the WTO‘s TRIPS 
Council of its intention to import compulsory licensed drugs 
from Canada for public health reasons.
104
   Per the requirements 
of Canada‘s Regime, the generic manufacturer actively sought 
voluntary licenses from GlaxoSmithKline, Shire, and 
Boehringer Ingelheim, the patent holders for the drugs.
105
 
Despite efforts to negotiate, the three pharmaceutical companies 
were unwilling to issue a voluntary license.
106
  It was not until 
Rwanda sent notification to the TRIPS Council requesting a 
compulsory license that the patent holders changed their 
mind.
107
 The Canadian government issued a compulsory license, 
and the generic manufacturer began negotiations with 
Rwanda.
108
 However, this long protracted process delayed 
Rwanda‘s ability to receive the necessary drugs.  While Rwanda 
filled its original notice of intent with TRIPS in July 2007, its 
first shipment of drugs from the Canadian generic manufacturer 
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was not sent until September 2008, almost fifteen months 
later.
109
    
While one could argue that the Canadian scheme for 
compulsory licensing hindered the negotiations and created the 
time delay, the procedural requirements of TRIPS and Article 
31-bis could be equally at fault. These procedural requirements 
include creating detailed domestic legislation.  Countries are not 
only nervous or unwilling to ratify the amendment, but also 
uncomfortable relying on compulsory licensing to ensure access 
to medicines. 
V.  THE THREAT OF INVOKING COMPULSORY LICENSES CAN 
MAKE PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES MORE WILLING TO 
NEGOTIATE 
Even if countries are not going to issue compulsory licenses, 
there remains a short-term benefit in maintaining an effective 
compulsory licensing scheme under Article 31-bis.  The mere 
possibility of compulsory licensing tends to strengthen the 
bargaining position of governments, even if it is rarely invoked.  
For example, Brazil has threatened to use compulsory licenses 
as permitted under the TRIPS Agreement.
110
  Such overtures 
influenced numerous pharmaceutical companies, including 
Abbott Laboratories, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, and Roche 
Brazil to come to the negotiation table. Many of these 
companies ultimately made drastic concessions regarding the 
medications‘ costs.111    
Threats of compulsory licensing worked for Brazil during 
negotiations with drug companies to lower the prices of anti-
AIDS drugs.  It also worked for the U.S. when negotiating with 
Bayer for Cipro during the anthrax scare.
112
 However, the 
international community should not rely on threats of 
compulsory licensing to provide developing countries access to 
medicines.  There is a fundamental difference between Brazil or 
the United States threatening to issue a compulsory license, and 
a small sub-Saharan country threatening to do the same. Brazil 
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and the United States have large populations, which constitute a 
large share of the pharmaceutical consumption market. 
Pharmaceutical companies are more willing to lose some profits 
in these large markets than lose all profits to a compulsory 
license.
113
 A small sub-Saharan country with far fewer 
consumers would not possess the same amount of bargaining 
power.  Thus, threats of compulsory licensing are only a short-
term solution for many countries in their attempts to gain access 
to medicines. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, there is ―neither a strong experiential basis for 
recommending acceptance of the [Article 31-bis] Amendment, 
nor of declining to accept it.‖114   Most developing countries 
have yet to ratify Article 31-bis, likely because they fear 
repercussions from developed countries, or from the 
pharmaceutical companies themselves.  
The procedural requirements necessary to comply with 
Article 31-bis and the TRIPS compulsory scheme are 
complicated and unduly bureaucratic.  At the end of the day, the 
purpose of the amendment is to deliver medicines to those most 
in need.  If stringent procedural requirements make compulsory 
licensing unattractive as a means to obtaining  medicines, then 
the WTO needs to go back to the drawing board and develop a 
new regime.   
WTO General Council Char Mohamed insists that while the 
waiver and amendment have not been used as often as 
anticipated, both have still ―been effective, since drug prices 
have fallen significantly since [they were] adopted in 2003.‖115  
While the lower drug costs may increase a developing country‘s 
access to medicines, the WTO still needs to do more to ensure 
greater access.  After all, the international community cannot 
allow intellectual property rights to interfere and ―prevent 
[WTO] [m]embers from taking measures to protect public 
health.‖116 
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